The attraction of a sea route through the Arctic has long captivated sailors looking for faster transit between markets. However, the impassable ice covering the vast majority of Arctic waters has been an inflexible barrier to shipping aspirations for centuries. Recent global warming trends are giving rise to an increasingly accessible maritime domain throughout the Arctic basin, creating enormous potential for the area. Diminishing ice cover, abundant natural resources and changing geopolitical trends are prompting stakeholders to reexamine the Arctic’s vast economic and strategic potential.
The Arctic’s strategic environment is evolving as the region warms and global stakeholders are attracted by the increasingly accessible natural resources. Maritime activity will be driven by a combination of economic and military trends. The Arctic’s growing geopolitical attention will likely bring increased military activity to protect the national interests of key stakeholders. These interests include both natural resources – the huge reserves of oil and gas as well as minerals – and the opening up of maritime trade routes. While the number of ships in transit will remain low for the foreseeable future due to the complexities of operating in the region, there will be an increase in commercial shipping activity in support of resource extraction.
Most of this commercial shipping activity will take place in Russian waters, as a result of the country’s robust approach to Arctic development. Other maritime traffic will also increase as the ice recedes. Recreational traffic – cruise ships, sailing yachts and private motorboats – will continue to seek to take advantage of the newly accessible region to engage in ‘last chance’ tourism. International fishing fleets are following migratory species northwards, a phenomenon that is set to continue as global warming pushes fish into colder waters. Although a moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean has been in place for more than a decade, warming waters are likely to bring with them illicit activities.
While it is essential to develop greater maritime domain awareness in the region in order to monitor and prevent illicit activities, the total amount of traffic will remain a small fraction of overall activity. Trends in the Arctic – particularly economic and geopolitical trends driven by regional warming – will bring greater maritime activity to the region. However, this activity will be more suited to local needs than universal across the Arctic. Resource extraction will require transport to markets, and specialised vessels will continue to provide this transport. But the northern waters will not become a widely used global shipping route in the near future. New geopolitical tensions and subsequent militarisation could also hamper commercial activity in the region. The costs of operating in the Arctic are high; misperceptions and misunderstandings in the region have the potential to trigger conflicts.
Recent geostrategic developments have raised concerns about the militarisation of the Arctic, a region long identified by the maxim ‘High North, Low Tension’. The viability of future maritime activity in the Arctic faces significant challenges, and the complexities of operating in the region will dampen the enthusiasm of most stakeholders. While maritime traffic remains limited to a small fraction of global activity, it is critical to better understand the challenges and drivers of traffic in the region and their impact on regional security and stability.
As economic interests grow, so do military activities. Over the past decade, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US have prominently expanded their military capabilities in the Arctic region. Military exercises continue to be carried out in these harsh conditions, on a larger scale and with greater frequency, namely Trident Juncture 2018, Cold Response 2022, and Grom 2019 exercises. The development of capabilities, together with the increase in weapons testing and military exercises, indicates a growing margin for the risk of escalation or outright conflict. NATO’s approach to the region is not yet enshrined in a clear strategy for the Arctic, and the new Strategic Concept focusing on defence and deterrence, unveiled in June 2022 at the NATO Summit in Madrid, refers to potential disruptions in the High North from “allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic”.
One of the main concerns of some states is that growing economic interests, which are outwardly civilian in nature, could support states in strengthening their military presence in the Arctic. By promoting infrastructure development and access, states fear that such activities may be benefiting dual interests, where the publicly shared goal is presented as benign under the guise of ‘scientific research’ or commercial interest. The annual US Reports to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China raised these concerns, stating that ‘civilian research could support an enhanced Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include the deployment of submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attack.’ A 2021 US report notes the growing success of Chinese technologies in icebreaker construction and observes that Chinese interests in the Arctic have presented possible bilateral frictions with Russia over the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), but also opportunities for greater cooperation. The experts noted the complexities of this relationship with regard to the Arctic, noting Russia’s previous position regarding the limited role of non-Arctic states in the region, which has undergone some changes as geopolitical dynamics have evolved. However, the experts noted that there is slow progress in Russian cooperation with China in the Arctic (demonstrated by the reluctance to allow Chinese investment in upstream projects), which may change with China’s growing involvement in the region.
Russia’s military capabilities and infrastructure are noteworthy (Figure 1) compared to the five Arctic littoral states, especially the capacity of its ballistic missile submarine force (SSBN). Russia has more than 80 per cent of its nuclear deterrent capability based at sea, including at least seven of its SSBNs near the Kala peninsula.
These capabilities are valuable for Russian forces, especially in the context of growing tensions between nations in Europe. For the same reason, the Russian Northern Fleet’s access to Arctic shipping lanes ensures Russia’s ability to continue operating in the North Atlantic and has significant strategic value. US capabilities in the region are also essential to its defence. US bases in Greenland and Alaska house sensors and radars for missile warning and facilitate space surveillance by the US Space Command (Shinzato, 2021). The Arctic region is therefore an integral element of both US missile defence and its Space Situational Awareness capabilities. This general trend towards modernisation and military reinforcement in the Arctic increases the potential for escalation and the need for risk reduction measures adapted to these scenarios.
The reduction in distance between the main centres of production (China) and attraction of cargo (Northern Europe) is significant, which, combined with the effect of climate change, makes it possible to consider the navigability and viability of these routes in a way that is competitive in commercial terms. Reducing the distance could potentially lead to a significant decrease in journey times between the main European ports and the main Asian ports. When we analyse the statistics for ships with a gross tonnage of more than 50,000 Deadweight tonnage (DWT) in the NSR, we see that their average speed is significantly lower than the average speed of ships following the Suez Route or the Cape Route. A traditional container ship sails at 16 knots on the Far East Route (via the Suez Canal / via the Cape of Good Hope). On the NSR, the average speed does not exceed 12 knots. The reduction in geographical distance does not translate significantly into a more competitive transit time. Another aspect to consider is navigation safety. The number of accidents on the NSR is very significant. A third of these accidents are related to failures in the propulsion system, a figure significantly higher than other shipping routes and which is closely associated with low temperatures and adverse sea conditions.
The decisive issue that calls into question the viability of the NSR as an alternative to the Far East Routes (via Suez or the Cape) is the size of the ships and the associated economies of scale. Ships of the ‘Articmax’ type (the maximum size for sailing on the NSR) have no chance of competing with the economies of scale associated with the latest-generation container ships that ply the world’s main maritime routes, and particularly the Far East Sea Routes. Ships of the ‘Articmax’ type are limited in terms of beam and draught, carrying a maximum of 2,500 to 4,500 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs). The compulsory ‘escort’ of icebreakers limits the maximum breadth of these ships to 30 metres (corresponding to the breadth of the icebreaker). There are also some natural limitations, such as the Bering Strait and the Laptev Strait, which limit the draft of ships to a maximum of between 10 and 12 metres (Table 1 and Figure 2).
Even in a scenario of great political and social instability in the Middle East, the NSR will not be a credible alternative to the Far East Route (either via the Suez Canal or the Cape Route) for the maritime connection between Asia and Europe in the near future. The limitations in terms of breadth, draught and navigational safety dictate this. Only ships of up to 4,500 TEU can use it. Added to this is the lack of a port network to support the creation of a logistics distribution network. The advantage in terms of physical distance is also limited by the low average speed of navigation.
The constraints in terms of draught and breadth of the ships that can pass through the NSR make this route unprofitable compared to the routes through the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope. The only passage without these constraints will be the Polar Route, which, however, is not expected to open permanently in the coming decades. In addition, in order to be profitable, an Arctic route would have to allow safe passage all year round, because the logistics chains that are needed to complement maritime transport cannot be modified seasonally, which would increase the final transport costs. In addition, the increased risk of accidents during the passage will remain high due to water temperatures, which will be low despite the thaw, and adverse weather conditions. This risk will increase final transport costs due to the premiums charged by insurers to cover this risk.
For Portugal, in the short and medium term, there will be no consequences in terms of maritime traffic, specifically the use of the port of Sines. Opening up to Arctic shipping will not prevent Sines from being a port hub for Western Europe for containerised and bulk cargo. On the other hand, with regard to the general situation in the Arctic, the approaches of Russia and China mean that Portugal and its Allies are keeping a close eye on developments in the geopolitical, geoeconomic and military situation, as there is a recognised interest on the part of these two states to use the Arctic to their advantage, with the subsequent challenges for the international system. Moreover, one of the vectors of this positioning is access to the North Atlantic, a situation that could increase tension in this area of interest to Portugal. In this sense, Portugal will be ready to support its Allies, diplomatically and with military capabilities that can be deployed in the area as far as possible. Recently, during a NATO exercise, the Portuguese submarine Arpão sailed under the polar ice cap and was the first non-nuclear powered submarine known to have done so. This mission served to demonstrate to its Allies and potential adversaries Portugal’s ability to operate in those areas, being ready to monitor Russian submarines and maintain a deterrent presence to prevent a possible future more active stance by Russia in the Arctic area.