Dividing lines in the Arctic appear more solid every day. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had repercussions throughout the world, including the isolation of Russia from the other seven Arctic countries. Where the Arctic was once held up as a “zone of peace”, with multinational institutions such as the Arctic Council and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, today we see attention to militarization, diplomatic isolation, and economic sanctions. The idea of “Arctic exceptionalism”, that things can happen differently in the Arctic regardless of what is happening elsewhere in the world, would appear to have disappeared.
But perhaps not all hope is lost. While Russia and the West have are just beginning what will be a long journey back to cooperative relations, the prospects for China may be different. At present, China has been working with Russia on the Yamal LNG project. But unlike Russia, China appears to have less interest in alienating the West. China continues to engage in the work of the Arctic Council and to seek economic opportunities with other Arctic countries as well.
That said, tensions between China and the United States remain high. Disputes about trade, the status of the South China Sea, and Taiwan continue to make headlines. It is easy to lump China together with Russia on many issues, including the Arctic. Which is all the more reason to consider the potential for a new Arctic exceptionalism, between China and the U.S.
In a recent article in Marine Policy (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106294), we build on ideas proposed by REN Yuanyuan in The Yearbook of Polar Law Online in 2023 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116427_014010006). Specifically, we suggest that the Arctic is an opportunity for China and the U.S. to try a different approach. Compared with other topics and locations, the stakes in the Arctic are low for both countries. In contrast to Russia, Arctic affairs are not a core focus for either one.
On the other hand, the potential benefit from developing a cooperative relationship could be enormous. Mutual trust is in short supply at present. Both countries are adept at finding reasons to doubt the other’s sincerity. Both are capable of sending mixed signals and also of misinterpreting each other’s words and actions. Working together on small matters, at the margins of their interests, is a chance to increase mutual understanding, to go beyond expectations colored by stereotype. Scientific collaboration, tourism, and governance measures for the Central Arctic Ocean are three areas China and the U.S. already work together and could do more.
We recognize that a cooperative scenario on a larger scale is optimistic. It is more likely that common interest and the West’s reaction will drive China and Russia closer together, exacerbating Arctic divisions. Nonetheless, we prefer to look for and suggest an alternative. At the very least, we may hope that the well-being of the Arctic does not become collateral damage to affairs far from the North. And maybe, just maybe, the Arctic can create an opportunity that the world needs, to avoid mutually and globally damaging confrontation between China and the U.S.